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Martha C. Nussbaum’s truly magnificent contribution to ethics and 
to social system reform has been widely acknowledged and applauded. 
Professor at the University of Chicago, Nussbaum was appointed by its 
Department of Philosophy, the Law School, and the Divinity School as 
the Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics. An 
active writer since the 1970s and author of more than a dozen books, her 
most recent publications include Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of 
America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (Basic Books, 2008), From 
Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (Ox-
ford University Press, 2010), and Not For Profit: Why Democracy 
Needs the Humanities (Princeton University Press, 2010).
Her most recent book, Political Emotions. Why Love Matters for Justice, 
addresses the importance of forging a public culture that fosters emotions 
that sustain a decent liberal society. As Nussbaum herself points out, her 
account on just societies is greatly indebted to John Rawls’s ideal society, as 
presented in A Theory of Justice (1971), one of freedom and equality. But 
unlike Rawls, she does not deal with the inner workings of just societies, but 
rather with those societies that aspire to justice. Moreover, Nussbaum’s book 
focuses on only one of the various elements that Rawls takes into consid-
eration, and that any society seeking justice –whatever justice may be– that 
wants the political principles underpinning it to be stable over time must 
take into account: emotions directed toward the common good. In her 
opinion, other political theorists’ doctrines lack this element.
For Nussbaum, it is undeniable that without emotions that take as 
their object something beyond the self, human beings tend to enclose 
themselves within narcissistic projects. This is why she firmly believes 
that the emotions that ought to be fostered are “eudaimonistic” emo-
tions– meaning that they evaluate the world from the individual’s point 
of view, as she had already discussed in Upheavals of Thought (2001)– 
which include others in one’s own “circle of concern.” Therefore the 
others’ worries and concerns might be felt as one’s own. Nussbaum goes 
on to suggest that Rawls’ approach relies too heavily on emotions that 
take as their object abstract principles rather than particulars, overriding 
the fact that human beings identify themselves more easily with abstract 
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values when they are mediated by particular emotions attached to par-
ticular symbols, memories, and collective history. 
Thus Nussbaum argues for the need to promote concrete emotions 
–directed to the concrete nation’s aims, its institutions and leaders, its 
geography and fellow citizens– that support certain principles and values, 
among which she particularly underlines equal opportunities for all, the 
badness of several forms of discrimination and hierarchy, and social re-
distribution (in the form of health, education, housing, and a decent 
level of welfare for everybody). She further explains that any promoted 
values cannot be typical of one concrete group, but must be an area of a 
Rawlsian “overlapping consensus.”
Nussbaum hastens to point out that emotions prove crucial for sup-
porting any political view –be it liberal democracy, fascism, etc.– and 
therefore her books can also be of interest to people whose notion of 
justice could not be further from her own.
The book is divided into three parts. In the first, she discusses earlier 
sources that inspire her work and she discusses their strengths as well as 
their weaknesses to be overcome. As a starting point, she chooses a 
highly original political reading of Mozart’s and Lorenzo’s Da Ponte The 
Marriage of Figaro (1786) in which a flexible and compassionate attitude 
of love, life affirmation, and reciprocity –which according to Nussbaum 
opens up democracy– is privileged over the rigidity of the ancien régime 
hierarchies. Mozart, like Herder, seems to suggest that culture be “femi-
nized” by forging a “civil religion” that encourages said attitudes. But 
according to Nussbaum said proposals met with two strong oppositions: 
the honor-based emotion approach typical of the ancien régime, on the 
one hand, and the new capitalist culture based on individualistic ambition, 
on the other. Nussbaum then goes on to consider other intellectuals’ 
“civil religions,” such as Comte’s and Mill’s, and the way Tagore recast 
Comte’s ideas in a project more imbued with love, longing, and joy, 
which rejects the control typical of Comte’s.
To a large extent, Nussbaum leaves aside Locke’s ideas, because he 
does not acknowledge a need for good attitudes to be promoted by po-
litical culture; she leaves aside Kant’s because in order to protect freedom 
of speech, his concept of the state excludes the psychological emotions 
needed for stability; and Rousseau, whose “civil religion” is to be imposed 
coercively. And she aligns herself with Mill and Tagore, although she 
claims that they fail to focus (sufficiently) on the importance that institu-
tions should have in the promotion of the aforementioned values.
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The terms for the question that articulates her whole book are then 
set: how can a decent society promote stability and motivation without 
resorting to coercion?
The book’s second part explores the resources inherent in human 
psychology that ought to be kept in mind in such a project. Some emo-
tions should be cultivated –good emotions towards collective rights, and 
anger directed to the violation of other’s people rights. Others, such as 
the tendency to protect the weak by subordinating others, should be 
discouraged. And others encouraged only when associated with certain 
goals –think for example of shame: feeling ashamed of excessive greed 
ought to be favored, but the shame of having physical impairments should 
be overcome. She also claims that dissident voices –and a wide and solid 
critical culture– should not only be welcome but also encouraged.
Nussbaum then refers to a set of human tendencies toward “radical 
evil”, but believes that culture can do a lot to shape them. She lays special 
emphasis on how the love that children need in order to leave behind 
their initial solipsism, helplessness, anxiety, and consequent narcissism, 
must be continuous throughout life. Otherwise, this helplessness informs 
humans’ tendency to transform others into slaves, as we all did as children. 
This love –this outward erotic movement toward the world– must not 
only be cultivated in personal relationships, but also in the “potential 
space” of culture and the arts, because it is crucial for developing compas-
sion –that is, an emotion that takes as its object the suffering of another 
being–, which in turn is indispensable for the project in question. This is 
why certain patriotism –namely, love for the nation– that manages to 
build a narrative to include those groups usually excluded can be of great 
help. Special care must be taken in order to prevent individuals from 
inhibiting their compassion when they think that the other is in trouble 
because he has made defective choices, and also in order to ward off any 
form of anthropodenial –that is, classifying any group of other people as 
lower because of being supposedly “more animal.” Imagination and love 
should be used to overcome such problems.
The third and final part examines how the aforementioned emotions 
can be cultivated thanks to certain works of public art, songs, texts, po-
litical rhetoric, and even the design of public spaces. Nussbaum primar-
ily focuses on the United States and India, illustrating her proposal with 
the deeds and words of figures who mobilized a wide range of positive 
emotions, such as Washington, Lincoln, Gandhi, Nehru, and Roosevelt. 
What is telling in this regard is that Roosevelt –to take an example– did 
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not aim to unleash a debate about whether redistribution was just, but to 
foster emotional support for redistribution.
She further exemplifies her ideas with works of public art. Of particular 
relevance, she shows, are some recent attempts undertaken in Chicago, such 
as the Millenium Park (2004), commissioned by the City Council, and the 
playful atmosphere fostered in it by the Cloud Gate, by Anish Kappor, 
and the Crown Fountain, by Jaume Plensa, which create a friendly atmos-
phere, one of inclusion, bodily joy, and loss of formality that makes people 
less suspicious of each other. She also points out the University of Chicago’s 
ongoing effort to destigmatize certain areas surrounding the campus associ-
ated with crime by building, for example, the Logan Arts Center, where 
activities in cooperation with the adjacent district of Woodlawn are planned, 
and the everybody-welcome Ice Rink, in the midst of what was considered 
a dangerous no-man’s land that separated the university from neighborhoods 
with a rather high index of poverty and crime.
Nussbaum concludes by asking if love should be only a tool to reach 
the aforementioned political goals, and would therefore no longer be 
needed were said goals achieved, or if it is rather one of the goals. She 
stands clearly on this second option: loving citizens are not only a crucial 
instrument for her project, but also one of its aims, since they are more 
desirable than citizens who just do the right things but who actually are 
mere “empty shells.”
Resting upon a realistic picture of human nature that seriously takes 
into account its flaws, Political Emotions constitutes an optimistic ap-
proach to the path that leads to justice. It must also be highlighted that 
Nussbaum protects her project particularly well from potential objections. 
First, she makes it clear that she is well aware that, despite focusing her 
work on them, emotions without arguments are useless. Second, she 
suggests that her theory of justice might need more than emotional sup-
port –meaning economic support–, but explains that examining whether 
economic issues could constitute an obstacle for her project is just not 
within the scope of her book. Nussbaum’s work therefore warmly invites 
scholars from various disciplines to complement her work. She opens up 
a fertile path, and does not deny that there is definitely a lot to be done 
to make her project a reality.
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